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OPINION OF THE COURT  
___________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Abdulmalik Mahyoub Mulhi Abdulla petitions for 
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order 
denying his motion for certification of late-filed appeal.  After 
an immigration judge (“IJ”) ordered Abdulla removed from 
the United States, Abdulla had 30 days to appeal that order to 
the BIA but did not do so for 78 days.  Abdulla moved the 
BIA to exercise its discretion to permit the late-filed appeal, 
citing the exceptional circumstances presented by his appeal, 
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which raises several claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Because we conclude that the BIA’s discretion in 
the context of this case is not cabined by law, regulation, or a 
settled course of prior agency action, we lack jurisdiction to 
review the BIA’s decision not to self-certify the late-filed 
appeal and will dismiss the petition for review in part.  We 
also conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review Abdulla’s 
unexhausted merits claim and non-colorable due process 
claim.  And because Abdulla’s other claims are unavailing, 




Abdulla was born in Yemen in 1976 to two Yemeni 
parents.  In 1986, when Abdulla was nine years old, his father 
became a naturalized United States citizen.  Three years later, 
Abdulla’s parents legally separated and then divorced.  
Abdulla and his brother, Fawaz Abdulla, joined their father in 
the United States in May 1990, and Abdulla became a lawful 
permanent resident at that time.  Abdulla contends that in that 
same year, his father filed N-600 applications to naturalize 
both children, but that due to former counsel’s ineffective 
assistance, this documentation was not made part of the 
Administrative Record.  While Fawaz Abdulla received proof 
of United States citizenship in 1995, Abdulla claims that his 
application was never processed for reasons unknown.1  
In 2014, Abdulla was convicted of food stamp fraud, 
wire fraud, and aiding and abetting, in the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland.  In March 2017, 
 
1 According to the United States Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”), Abdulla’s N-400 naturalization 
application was filed in 1996 and denied in 2009. 
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DHS issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) alleging that 
Abdulla was not a United States citizen and that as a result of 
his federal criminal convictions, he was subject to removal.  
DHS served the NTA on Abdulla in January 2018.  The NTA 
served on Abdulla at that time did not specify the date and 
time of Abdulla’s first hearing, providing only that the date 
and time of the hearing remained to be set. 
 
In Abdulla’s removal hearing before the IJ, Abdulla’s 
prior counsel argued that Abdulla had acquired derivative 
United States citizenship based on the law in effect at the time 
of his birth, and that Abdulla therefore could not be removed 
from the United States.  Abdulla’s prior counsel also moved 
to terminate the removal proceedings, contending that DHS 
had failed to establish that Abdulla’s convictions were 
aggravated felonies under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (“INA”).  The motion to terminate did not, however, raise 
any argument that the NTA was improper because of its 
failure to provide the date and time of Abdulla’s first hearing 
or that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction as a result of 
Abdulla’s derivative citizenship, both of which Abdulla now 
identifies as failures amounting to constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Abdulla similarly faults his prior 
counsel for failing to bring any claims for relief under INA § 
212(h) (waiver of inadmissibility for certain crimes). 
 
In May 2018, the IJ denied Abdulla’s motion to 
terminate and sustained the charge of removability against 
Abdulla.  Abdulla’s prior counsel then petitioned for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”) on his behalf.  In his application for 
asylum and withholding of removal, Abdulla explained that 
he feared harm if he returned to Yemen as a result of the civil 
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war, noting specifically that the Houthi rebels are hostile 
towards Sunni Muslims such as himself and that while he 
opposes violence, he fears that the Yemeni military would 
force him to fight.  
 
On October 4, 2018, the IJ denied Abdulla’s petition 
and ordered him removed from the United States.  Abdulla’s 
appeal to the BIA was due on November 5, 2018, but it was 
not filed until December 21, 2018, shortly after Abdulla 
retained new counsel.  That appeal included both a motion for 
an emergency stay of removal and a motion for certification 
of Abdulla’s late-filed appeal.  In support of the motion for 
certification of late-filed appeal, Abdulla noted that the BIA 
has previously held that where a case presents exceptional 
circumstances, the BIA may certify the case to itself even 
though it was filed after the deadline.  Abdulla contended that 
his failure to file a timely appeal occurred for reasons that 
were both beyond his control and exceptional, because while 
detained, he reasonably expected that his prior counsel would 
act to preserve his appeal rights and that upon learning that 
prior counsel had failed to do so, he acted with “speed, 
diligence, and zeal” in asking new counsel to seek to 
prosecute his appeal.  Administrative Record 22.  Abdulla 
sought to present on appeal his principal argument — that he 
is a United States citizen — as well as his alternative claims 
to relief that he is eligible for (a) adjustment of status or 
waiver of inadmissibility and (b) asylum, withholding of 
removal, and CAT relief. 
 
On January 10, 2019, the BIA, noting that the appeal 
was untimely by seven weeks, found that Abdulla failed to 
demonstrate exceptional circumstances for certification of the 
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appeal and accordingly dismissed the appeal.  This timely 




The BIA had jurisdiction to hear Abdulla’s appeal 
under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15.  As we hold 
infra, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary 
decision to decline to self-certify Abdulla’s appeal as well as 
Abdulla’s unexhausted merits claim.2  However, we do have 
jurisdiction to review Abdulla’s legal claim for derivative 
United States citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5).  See 
Espichan v. Att’y Gen., 945 F.3d 794, 796 (3d Cir. 2019).  
We also have jurisdiction to review Abdulla’s legal claim that 
the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the 
removal proceedings because of the NTA’s failure to state the 
date and time of his initial hearing.  See Nkomo v. Att’y 
Gen., 930 F.3d 129, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) (exercising 
jurisdiction over identical claim).  Finally, we have 
jurisdiction to review “colorable” due process claims.  
Calderon-Rosas v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 




2 Although we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over 
Abdulla’s challenge to the BIA’s decision not to exercise its 
discretion to self-certify the late-filed appeal, we have 
jurisdiction to determine our own jurisdiction.  See Orie v. 




We exercise plenary review over Abdulla’s due 
process claim and questions of law.  Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 




Abdulla asks us to review the BIA’s decision not to 
self-certify his late-filed appeal.  We lack jurisdiction to do so 
here. 
 
The BIA is empowered by regulation to exercise 
appellate jurisdiction over procedurally improper appeals, 
where it chooses to self-certify such an appeal.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(c) (“Jurisdiction by certification”).  This regulation 
provides:   
 
The Board in its discretion may review any . . . 
case [arising under its appellate jurisdiction] by 
certification without regard to the provisions of 
§ 1003.7 if it determines that the parties have 
already been given a fair opportunity to make 
representations before the Board regarding the 
case, including the opportunity [to] request oral 
argument and to submit a brief. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
The Administrative Procedure Act provides for 
judicial review of final agency actions except where judicial 
review is precluded by statute or where “agency action is 
committed to agency discretion by law.”  5 U.S.C. § 701(a).  
Agency action is deemed “committed to agency discretion by 
law,” id., where a law is drawn “so that a court would have no 
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meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s 
exercise of discretion,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 
(1985). 
 
Section 1003.1(c) provides that the BIA “may” self-
certify an appeal “in its discretion,” without any limiting 
language, meaning that there is no standard by which we can 
review the BIA’s exercise of discretion.  Nor do other 
regulations or statutes provide us with a benchmark for 
review of this agency action.  So we lack jurisdiction to 
review this discretionary decision. 
 
Abdulla contends that we can review the BIA’s 
decision because in other cases, the BIA has made clear its 
power to self-certify appeals that present “exceptional 
circumstances.”  See Matter of Liadov, 23 I&N Dec. 990, 993 
(BIA 2006) (noting that “[w]here a case presents exceptional 
circumstances, the Board may certify a case to itself under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(c)”).  According to Abdulla, the BIA erred in 
determining that his appeal did not present extraordinary 
circumstances.3  But the BIA has not elaborated the content 
of that standard, making it impossible for us to determine 
whether a given case does or does not present the type of 
“extraordinary circumstances” that might merit self-
certification of a late-filed appeal. 
 
 
3 Abdulla bases his claim of extraordinary 
circumstances primarily on his arguments that he acquired 
derivative citizenship and that his NTA’s defects deprived the 
immigration court of jurisdiction.  As we explain below, those 
arguments are foreclosed under our binding precedent. 
9 
 
While this question is one of first impression in this 
Court, we are also guided by our earlier jurisprudence in a 
related area.  In our decision in Sang Goo Park v. Attorney 
General, we considered a petitioner’s request that we review 
the BIA’s denial of his request for “sua sponte” reopening 
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  846 F.3d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 
2017).  Under that regulation as well, “the BIA may reopen a 
case at any time,” and it “has held . . . that it will do so only in 
extraordinary circumstances.”  Id. at 647–48.  We noted that 
the agency’s “discretion in this area is . . . so broad . . . that 
we have no meaningful way to review it, thereby depriving us 
of jurisdiction over orders denying sua sponte reopening.”  Id. 
at 648. 
 
In Sang Goo Park, we explained two exceptions to our 
lack of jurisdiction to review orders denying sua sponte 
reopening.  First, we have held that “when the BIA relies on 
an incorrect legal premise in denying a motion to reopen sua 
sponte . . . . we may exercise jurisdiction . . . and remand to 
the BIA so that it may exercise its sua sponte authority under 
the correct legal framework.”  Id. at 651 (citation omitted).  
Second, we held under the “settled course exception” that we 
may exercise jurisdiction over the denial of sua sponte 
reopening if a petitioner can “establish that the BIA has 
limited its discretion via a policy, rule, settled course of 
adjudication, or by some other method, such that the BIA’s 
discretion can be meaningfully reviewed for abuse.”  Id. at 
653.  However, we concluded that the BIA cases cited by the 
petitioner “d[id] not lead to the reasonable inference that the 
BIA ha[d] done so here.”  Id. at 656. 
 
Neither of the Sang Goo Park exceptions, even if they 
are applicable to this case, permit review of Abdulla’s 
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petition.  The BIA did not rely on any incorrect legal premise 
in declining to self-certify the appeal.  Nor has Abdulla 
identified any manner in which the BIA has limited its own 
discretion in this area such that that discretion can be 
reviewed for abuse.  Notwithstanding the similarities between 
Sang Goo Park and this case, Abdulla presents no argument 
explaining why a different outcome should result here.  Nor 
can we discern one. 
 
In concluding that, as a general matter, we lack 
jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to self-certify an 
appeal, we join the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.  See Idrees v. Barr, 923 F.3d 539, 
543 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Because we do not have jurisdiction to 
review the IJ and BIA’s decision not to certify [the 
petitioner’s] . . . claim, we dismiss his appeal of the failure to 
certify.”); Vela-Estrada v. Lynch, 817 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 
2016) (same); Liadov v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1003, 1011 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (concluding that “the BIA’s refusal to self-certify 
was an unreviewable action committed to the agency’s 
discretion”); Mahamat v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1281, 1284 
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that “insofar as [the petitioner] 
argues that the BIA should have certified his case for review 
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(c),” the court “lack[s] jurisdiction”). 
 
And while our sister Courts of Appeals have identified 
certain limited exceptions to this rule, those exceptions 
largely track those identified in Sang Goo Park.  Compare, 
e.g., Vela-Estrada, 817 F.3d at 71 n.1 (“Where, in denying 
certification, the BIA misperceives the law or misunderstands 
its own jurisdiction, it is appropriate to remand to allow the 
BIA to consider its authority.”), with Sang Goo Park, 846 
F.3d at 651 (“[W]hen the BIA relies on an incorrect legal 
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premise in denying a motion to reopen sua sponte . . . . we 
may exercise jurisdiction . . . and remand to the BIA so that it 
may exercise its sua sponte authority under the correct legal 
framework.” (citation omitted)).  Compare also Idrees, 923 
F.3d at 543 n.3 (“We do not hold that judicial review of the 
BIA’s refusal to certify a case is never appropriate.  In other 
contexts, we have held that, even where a regulation commits 
a matter to agency discretion, the court may review the 
decision if there is ‘law to apply’ in doing so.” (citation 
omitted)), with Sang Goo Park, 846 F.3d at 653 (identifying 
the “settled course exception” to our lack of jurisdiction to 
review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen sua sponte).  
For the same reasons that Sang Goo Park’s exceptions do not 
permit review of Abdulla’s claim, the exceptions identified by 
our sister Courts of Appeals are also unavailing. 
 
Accordingly, we cannot exercise jurisdiction over 
Abdulla’s claim that the BIA erred in declining to self-certify 




Abdulla next argues that the immigration court lacked 
jurisdiction because DHS failed to prove his removability by 
clear and convincing evidence, relying on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009).  
 
4 Abdulla raises various merits arguments in support of 
his claim that the BIA abused its discretion in declining to 
self-certify his late-filed appeal.  Because we conclude that 
we lack jurisdiction to review that discretionary decision, we 
only discuss one of his merits claims, in section IV below, 
which Abdulla raises separately. 
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The Government responds that Abdulla failed to exhaust his 
merits arguments, and that we therefore lack jurisdiction to 
review this claim.  In support of this proposition, the 
Government cites our decision in Bejar v. Ashcroft, in which 
we noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1252 requires the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies “prior to seeking judicial review of a 
final . . . removal order” and held that the “failure [to] timely . 
. . appeal to the BIA . . . constitutes a failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.”  324 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2003).  
Abdulla replies that he exhausted his administrative remedies 
by raising his merits claims to the BIA in his untimely filing, 
because that filing “demonstrate[d] exceptional circumstances 
and ineffective assistance of counsel.”  Abdulla Reply Br. 8. 
 
Abdulla does not address Bejar but instead relies on 
our holding in Lin v. Attorney General that “so long as an 
immigration petitioner makes some effort, however 
insufficient, to place the Board on notice of a straightforward 
issue being raised on appeal, a petitioner is deemed to have 
exhausted her administrative remedies.”  543 F.3d 114, 121 
(3d Cir. 2008).  But Lin did not involve a claimed failure to 
exhaust due to an untimely appeal to the BIA.  The petitioner 
in that case did timely appeal the immigration court’s 
decision, and the question presented was whether or not the 
petitioner had failed to put the BIA on notice of a specific 
claim raised in the petition for review.  See id. at 119–22.  
Nothing in Lin calls into question our holding in Bejar.  For 
these reasons, we agree with the Government that Abdulla 
failed to exhaust this merits argument, and we therefore lack 
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jurisdiction to review it.  We will dismiss the petition in part 




Abdulla also contends that he was not the proper 
subject of removal proceedings and that the immigration 
court did not have jurisdiction for two additional reasons.  
Neither of these arguments are availing. 
 
First, Abdulla contends that the immigration court 
lacked jurisdiction because he is a United States citizen.  
Since he was never formally naturalized, his claim is that he 
qualified for derivative citizenship through his father’s 
naturalization, under the law at the time, former 8 U.S.C. § 
 
5 Abdulla bases his due process claim on his arguments 
that his prior counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his 
derivative citizenship status or that the defective NTA 
divested the immigration court of jurisdiction over his 
removal.  As we explain below, those arguments are 
foreclosed squarely by our binding precedent.  And in the 
context of “a petitioner seeking discretionary relief” who 
asserts “ineffective assistance of counsel or procedural due 
process claims,” we have jurisdiction only to review 
“colorable [constitutional] claims or questions of law.” 
Calderon-Rosas, 957 F.3d at 384 (quotation marks omitted) 
(alteration in original).  Given the outright foreclosure of 
Abdulla’s legal arguments by our precedent, his due process 
arguments are not colorable, so we therefore lack jurisdiction 
to consider them.  Cf. id. at 386 (“Because Calderon-Rosas’s 
due process claims are also colorable on their merits . . . our 
review of those claims is a proper exercise of jurisdiction.”). 
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1432(a).  But as we have interpreted that statute — in binding 
precedent — Abdulla is statutorily ineligible for derivative 
citizenship.  In order for a child to be eligible for derivative 
citizenship under that provision, the parents must legally 
separate before the custodial parent becomes naturalized.  See 
Jordan v. Att’y Gen., 424 F.3d 320, 330 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(noting that “a child seeking to establish derivative 
citizenship under § 1432(a) must prove,” inter alia, “that his 
[parent] was naturalized after a legal separation from his 
[other parent]” (quoting Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 257 
(3d Cir. 2005))).  Abdulla does not dispute that he fails to 
satisfy this requirement.  He instead contends that Jordan was 
wrongly decided, but under Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1 we are 
bound by that decision. 
 
Second, because Abdulla’s NTA failed to provide the 
date and time of his first hearing, Abdulla contends that the 
immigration court never obtained jurisdiction, relying on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 
2105 (2018).  But we rejected this argument in Nkomo v. 
Attorney General, 930 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2019), and under 
Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1, we are bound by Nkomo. 
 
For these reasons, Abdulla’s challenges to the 
jurisdiction of the immigration court fail.  We will therefore 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review in part and dismiss in part. 
